In light of this theoretical reasoning, I hypothesize that discussion in public arenas attenuates incentives to permanently exclude minorities from the distribution of benefits whereas private communication promotes the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority.
Thus, public discussion tends to promote the common good. Elster ( 1986) argues in a similar direction stating that it is almost impossible to make egoistic arguments in public debates. Hence, individuals will launder their own preferences and express only prosocial, ethical preferences in public settings and refrain from expressing egoistic arguments. Certain types of arguments that may be highly effective in private deliberations, simply cannot be articulated in a public arena. My argument follows Goodin ( 1986) who points out that individuals formulate their preferences in collective deliberations depending on the institutional environment. Accordingly, I argue that the effect of communication depends on whether actors communicate in a public or a private arena. As majority domination implies the exclusion of minorities and thus rests on the expression of predominantly egoistic motivations, majority tyranny becomes less likely in the presence of communication when minorities have a voice.ĭeliberative theory identifies publicity as one of the most important elements of deliberative processes (Thompson 2008, 510). On the other hand, a large body of research shows that communication strengthens prosocial orientations within groups (Bicchieri 2002 Ostrom 1998 Sally 1995). Moreover, it enables coalitions to arrange a common voting strategy and agree on a distribution of benefits among its members. Communication certainly greatly facilitates the identification of possible coalition partners. On the one hand, building and maintaining a coalition requires intensive coordination efforts among its members. From a theoretical perspective, communication cuts both ways.
In this paper, I explore the effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority. Hence, the tyranny of the majority can be defined as the permanent exploitation of the minority by the majority in democratic decisions over time.
Majority tyranny arises when winning majorities are fixed, and when there are no checks on the majority’s ability to dominate the minority (Guinier 1994, 4). If we think of politics as distributional conflicts of who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell 1936), democratic decision-making procedures frequently divide societies into winners and losers. One of the most frequently discussed troubles of democracy is the tyranny of the majority (e.g. When communication is private, however, majoritarian coalitions form that exclude a minority of group members from the distribution of benefits. Compared to a baseline treatment without communication, groups distribute benefits more equally when they have the opportunity to communicate in a public chat.
#Tyranny of the majority series
I test my claim in a series of laboratory experiments where five-member committees make distributional decisions using the voting mechanism ‘voting by veto’. The prosocial effects of communication dominate when communication is public whereas exclusive majorities form under private communication. I argue that publicity of communication is crucial. On the other hand, communication strengthens prosocial orientations in groups and should thus prevent the permanent exclusion of minorities. On the one hand, forming and maintaining a coalition requires coordination between individuals, which is barely accomplishable without opportunities to communicate.
Theoretically, communication cuts both ways. In this paper, I investigate the effects of communication on the occurrence of majority domination. It arises when winning majorities are fixed and permanent, and there are no checks on the majority’s ability to dominate the minority. The tyranny of the majority is one of the most frequently discussed problems of democracy in political theory.
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